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November 2006
Midcourse Corrections
Roger Bernhardt
The Suborned Subescrow
The first time I read the opinion in Markowitz v Fidelity Nat’l Title Co. (2006) 142 CA4th
508, 48 CR3d 217, reported at p 402, I was convinced that it was wrong. Indeed, each time I
reread it, that same feeling arose, although by now I have become persuaded that it really was
decided correctly.
Markowitz sued Fidelity because, as part of a refinancing—where Fidelity was supposed to
have an old deed of trust held by the original sellers reconveyed and replaced with a new one in
favor of the refinancing lender—it (Fidelity) recorded the new one but did not get the old one
reconveyed, thus leaving Markowitz’s title subject to both the old and the new liens. While his
major adversaries were the holders of the old deed of trust, who were refusing to release it
without more money, he also sued Fidelity for (among other things) breach of escrow contract
and breach of escrow agent fiduciary duties.
What caught my attention—and what seemed wrong to me—was the court’s conclusion that
Markowitz had no standing to complain about Fidelity’s behavior because he was not a party to
the instructions given to it. The sole giver of instructions to Fidelity, the court said, was City
National Bank, the refinancing lender. How, I asked myself, could Jill Culver, the named escrow
agent, possibly record a deed of trust against Markowitz’s title without an instruction from
Markowitz—or even worse, when Markowitz was not even a party to the escrow?
The answer is that she couldn’t do so, if she were really an escrow agent—but she certainly
could do so, if she weren’t functioning as an escrow agent. In this transaction, Culver was
operating as a “subescrow” agent; she had been hired by the bank to record the new deed of trust
(and reconveyance of the old), and to disburse funds when her employer (Fidelity) was prepared
to issue a title policy insuring the bank. This was not a conventional loan escrow where lender
and borrower submit their respective documents and valuables for transfer to the other on the
occurrence of the mutually stated conditions. Culver was working solely as an agent of the bank
in this transaction and needed no instructions from Markowitz to do what was required of her.
Subescrows are a phenomenon of the southern part of the state and one with which we in the
north are largely unfamiliar. Their existence is connected to the widespread operation of
independent escrow companies in the south and the attendant worries that those facilities
generate when large sums of money have to be entrusted somewhere; large reputable title
companies, on the other hand, are safe depositories for money even when they are not
functioning as true escrows.
There is a good explanation of this in State v PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP (2005) 125 CA4th
1219, 1279, 23 CR3d 529, rev’d on other grounds (2006) 39 C4th 1220, 48 CR3d 144, which is
unciteable (but, I hope, quotable):

An understanding of how ORTC [Old Republic Title Company] operates in Southern
California is helpful. There, escrow transactions are typically handled by independent escrow
companies. Buyers, sellers and lenders alike contract directly with the escrow company for
escrow services. The parties to a transaction address their escrow instructions to the escrow
company, which in turn performs the instructions without any involvement of companies such as
ORTC. Buyers, sellers and borrowers have no direct contact with ORTC. However, lenders
deposit their funds with ORTC. This latter arrangement is called a subescrow, although it is a
depositary relationship and not an escrow. A senior vice-president of Old Republic declared that
lenders often are “unwilling to deliver loan funds to independent escrow companies because
those companies frequently lack the size or longevity associated with solvency and liquidity.”
Thus, they insist on depositing their funds with a company such as ORTC.... The trial court noted
that in Southern California, buyers were parties to escrows conducted through independent
escrow companies, not ORTC. The situation in Southern California was very different because
the buyers were not customers of ORTC and had not entered into any agreements with ORTC.
Up north, on the other hand, the ownership of escrows by title companies eliminates that
particular need, although I understand that they are often used in refinancings by a lender to
guarantee that its loan funds are not disbursed until its deed of trust is recorded and insured, all
of which can be done by a title company as its agent, without the need for a “formal” escrow
involving the borrower. (Indeed, I believe City National Bank would have done the same up
north as it did in Markowitz down south.)
The term “subescrow” is quite misleading: Subescrows have nothing to do with escrows.
There was no escrow in the Markowitz loan transaction. The Markowitzes signed and delivered a
loan agreement, note, and deed of trust directly to City National Bank; they did not sign escrow
instructions and did not go through an escrow. They merely had to hope that the bank would not
misuse what they had signed before giving them the money it had promised. The bank, for its
part, sent the promised money to its trusted agent, Fidelity, with instructions to disburse it when
stated conditions were met. Since it was only following the instructions of one party, Fidelity
functioned not like an escrow agent, listening to two principals, but only as an ordinary agent
obeying its single master, City National Bank. There was no “one person” and “another person”
as Fin C §17003 contemplates for true escrows.
It is easy to forget that a transaction, even a big one, can be accomplished without an escrow.
X can give her deed or mortgage to Y without opening up an escrow to do it. Y can record that
document (if it was properly signed and notarized) without needing instructions from X to do so,
at least as long as it is not done in the teeth of an instruction not to record it. If Y can record the
deed/mortgage to him, he can also ask Z, his agent, to record it for him (or to do so when Z is
satisfied that some other conditions have also been met). Z can do all this without any need to get
confirmation from X, and can call it a subescrow when it does so.
The reason I said (at the start of this column) that I reached the wrong conclusion every time I
read the opinion is because nowhere in the opinion is this distinction ever really made. The court
mentions that a subescrow was involved, but then—throughout all of its reasoning—speaks as if
a true escrow were involved, constantly referring to Fidelity as an escrow agent and citing
authorities dealing with escrow agent responsibilities. Given that Fidelity was a lender’s agent,
not an escrow agent for the lender and borrower, none of those references or arguments applies. I
only hope that others will not misread those statements to think that they can safely be used to
guide real escrow agents’ conduct.

Much of the trouble starts with the fact that California escrow law itself does not make much
sense. Historically, a valid escrow required an irrevocable delivery to the escrow agent. If the
grantor deposited the deed with any right to recall it, the receiver took the deed as his agent—and
not as an escrow agent—which meant that there was no relation back of the second delivery to
the first and that the grantor’s death, before the second delivery by the agent to the grantee,
terminated the agent’s authority and rendered any second delivery meaningless. (Thus, in all
those cases where the grantor said to the agent, “Deliver this to the grantee on my death, unless I
change my mind,” delivery was sure to fail, and people would not find that out until the grantor
was dead and it was too late to do it right.) California cases still have that requirement (Hayden v
Collins (1905) 1 CA 259, 263, 81 P 1120):
[I]t is absolutely essential to the validity and effectiveness of a deed in escrow that it be delivered
to a third person for the grantee, beyond any power in the grantor to recall or revoke it. The
grantor must clearly and unequivocally evidence an intent and purpose to part with the
possession and control of the deed for all time. In short, the delivery and transfer must be
irrevocable.
If that were the general rule for escrows, and escrow officers took that principle seriously, no
escrow would ever be valid. Few depositors ever intend to waive the right to change their minds
when depositing papers into escrow, and most escrow agents have a policy of refusing to accept
irrevocable instructions. Commercial escrows are not really escrows at all, in the historic sense
of the word, because the parties to them only have a conditional intent, i.e., to go through with
the deal only if the other side performs. But it hardly matters, because if they have an underlying
enforceable contract, they are bound to perform whether they want to or not. No seller has a
defense to the buyer’s specific performance action by saying, “But I don’t want to perform the
contract or deliver my deed.” The obligation of contract replaces the need for proper intent in
delivery.
This would not be a problem if our courts had described the situation by saying that there
either must be an irrevocable delivery or an enforceable contract for a second delivery from the
escrow agent to the grantee to be valid and relate back. But instead, we have made it sound like
one rule all jumbled up. Thus, Witkin says (12 Witkin, Summary of California Law, Real
Property §306 (2005)):
The prevailing rule ... is that the grantor and grantee must enter into a valid and binding
contract in order to make an irrevocable deposit. If there is no such contract, the grantor can
recover the deed from the escrow holder at any time before the condition is performed....
I suspect escrow officers pay as little attention to that statement as to the earlier one about
irrevocable intent, and do not attempt to determine the validity (or even the existence) of any
underlying contract between the parties.
The discrepancy between these two rules, for me, is best illustrated in Holland v McCarthy
(1916) 173 C 597, 603, 160 P 1069, in which the court stated that the enforceable contract
requirement does not apply “where the transaction is not to consummate a contract of sale, but
for the purpose of effecting a gift. Such transactions are governed by a different rule, and a
contract is not an essential part thereof.” This sounds like saying, “If you have a contract, you
need a contract, but not if you don’t have a contract.” The real explanation is not that you need to
have a contract in order to have an escrow, but that even when you don’t have an escrow

(because of conditional intent), the contract underlying it can be specifically enforced anyway, as
long as the contract is specifically enforceable.
Learning About New York Mortgage Practice
While I was preparing this column, I happened to receive a copy of Stein on New York
Commercial Mortgage Transactions (LexisNexis 2006), by Joshua Stein, a Latham & Watkins
attorney whom I previously persuaded to comment for us on nonrecourse carveouts (see the
Editor’s Take on Aozora Bank, Ltd. v 1333 N. Cal. Blvd. (2004) 119 CA4th 1291, 15 CR3d 340,
in 27 CEB RPLR 134 (Sept. 2004)). Practitioners who engage in commercial real estate deals
often enough brush up against New York practice, so I examined this work to see what it told me
about how this situation would play out there. It didn’t cover this particular transaction (they
have attorney-supervised “closings” rather than escrows most of the time), but I did conclude
that it was a generally useful book, and one that I will frequently turn to.

